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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of value-based performance mea-
sures – economic value added (EVA), market value added (MVA) and cash value added
(CVA) – with corporate governance using data on 41 corporations listed on the Istanbul
Stock Exchange-100 Index. Multiple panel regression is used covering the 1998–2007 period.
The findings indicate that EVA, MVA, and CVA increase if the CEO is a member of the
board at the same time, and board size does not significantly affect performance. Ownership
concentration is significantly related to all performance measures except for MVA, while
manager ownership is not a significant variable in increasing corporate performance. Foreign
ownership is found to increase EVA but decrease MVA.
Keywords CEO duality; Corporate governance; Firm performance; Ownership structure;
Value-based measures
JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34, L25
1. Introduction
Corporate scandals of the recent past involving companies such as Enron, World-
Com, Global Crossing, Tyco, etc. have irritated financial markets and have led to
losses suffered by stakeholders of corporations, primarily shareholders. Corporate
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scandals and economic crises connected to these scandals have resulted in a search
for ways to eliminate failures in corporate management. As a result, the concept of
corporate governance has arisen. Corporate governance is a good management pro-
cess by which corporations, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders at
maximum, can operate according to the principles of transparency, fairness,
accountability, and responsibility (Van Horne and Machowicz, 2005). Corporate
governance differentiates between the rights and responsibilities of the board of
directors, top managers, stockholders and other stakeholders, and arranges the rela-
tionships among the stakeholders. In addition, by determining the decision-making
rules and processes within the company, corporate governance sets forth the funda-
mental structure in which corporate goals and policies are determined. In this fun-
damental structure, corporate governance defines information as to how the
company can attract human capital and financial capital, how it can implement an
efficient operation policy, how in the long-run, implementations of any kind to
provide the stockholders with an economic value can be carried out.
Following corporate scandals and mismanagements, corporate governance has
become an indispensable element for financial markets. Corporate governance prac-
tices affect a wide range of parties ranging from national economies to interest
groups. As far as management is concerned, corporate governance can be defined as
the structure that makes it necessary for corporations to make the required arrange-
ments in management systems for increasing the performance of corporations and
ensuring that they operate in line with these arrangements. Implementing corporate
governance principles are in fact one of the fundamental requirements for compa-
nies to improve their performance. The financial success achieved by implementing
these principles is an indication of creating value. Therefore, corporate governance
can also be said to be targeted at increasing firm value, in other words be defined
as ‘‘a management approach aimed at contributing to the firm with an emphasis on
shareholder value’’. McKinsey and Company (2002) also state that well-managed
corporations – corporations that implement corporate governance principles better
– will have better performance. But what’s more curious is how corporate gover-
nance practices affect the financial performance of corporations.
Many studies have examined the relationship between financial performance and
the corporate governance applications of corporations (Bianco and Casavola, 1999;
Black et al., 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman et al., 2006; Kim and Yoon, 2007; Raja and
Kumar, 2007). Empirical studies cited have used various performance measures
relating to corporate governance. Among the most widely used performance mea-
sures are market-to-book value ratio (Black et al., 2006), Tobin’s Q ratio (Weir
et al., 2002; Hiraki et al., 2003; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), dividend yield (Gompers
et al., 2003), return on assets (Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Shrader et al., 1997; Him-
melberg et al., 1999), return on equity (Bhagat et al., 1999; Hutchinson and Gul,
2004), change in cash flows (Renneboog, 2000), return on stocks (Mitton, 2002),
changes in adjusted after-tax profitability (Bhagat and Black, 2000) and return on
sales (Boubakri et al., 2004). Considering the situation from a wider perspective,
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two groups of measures are seen to dominate the studies. The first group consists
of accounting-based traditional performance measures like return on assets and
return on equity, while the second group uses market-based measures along with
accounting-based measures. Generally, as market related performance measures,
stock returns based on stock prices or cumulative adjusted returns are considered.
In recent years, a more constructive, value-adding relationship between manage-
ment and stakeholders has been regarded as a requirement for corporate success.
Companies need to consult their stakeholders more to establish their strategies and
shape their future. Creating value is not regarded as an end in itself, but as a means
towards corporate success based on good governance fulfilling the needs of all stake-
holders as much as possible. As a result of the developments in financial theory in
recent years, ‘‘value maximization’’ has begun to be regarded as the eventual objec-
tive of corporations. With the increasing perception of value creation as an impor-
tant objective for all stakeholders, the performance measures of corporations have
been transformed and value-based performance measures like economic value added
(EVA), market value added (MVA) and cash value added (CVA) have been devel-
oped. Accounting-based performance measures do not consider the cost of invested
capital either in terms of risk-free rate and risk premium. Therefore, maximizing
earnings or return is not necessarily and implication of shareholder value maxi-
mization. Value-based performance measures are intended to eliminate the distor-
tions in accounting data to provide comparability across time, firms and industries.
After eliminating the distortions in accounting data, evaluations as to whether com-
panies are creating or destroying shareholder wealth are possible and more insightful
valuations can be provided (Venanzi, 2010). Value-based performance measures can
also be used to assess the efficiency and performance of managers within the context
of corporate governance. Lehn and Makhija (1996) find that companies with high
EVAs and MVAs have lower CEO turnover rates than companies with relatively low
EVAs and MVAs. In this study too, EVA, MVA and CVA are used as measures of
performance in the search for the relationship between corporate governance princi-
ples (chief executive officer-duality, size of the board of directors (SOTB), ownership
concentration, manager ownership, foreign ownership) and performance.
The study consists of five parts. In the following section, a summary of the stud-
ies that have investigated the relationship between corporate governance and corpo-
rate performance is presented. In Section 3 the econometric methodology and
model structure are presented. Section 4 covers the results of the econometric mod-
els. The last part concludes the study with general remarks.
2. Literature Review
In the literature, many variables including manager ownership, structure and SOTB,
ownership structure, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, the existence
of audit committees and the independence of the board of directors are used in
relation to corporate governance. Various performance measures are used in the
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studies. In this part of the study, a summary of the studies based on the relation-
ship between financial performance and corporate governance variables is given.
The results of some of the studies on the relationship between classical performance
measures and corporate governance variables are presented in Table 1.
There have been a limited number of studies done using performance measures
like EVA, MVA, etc. Coles et al. (2001) analyzed 144 US corporations based on the
regression of data from 1984 to 1988. The cited study attempts to explain the
changes in EVA and MVA by corporate governance variables like leadership struc-
ture, structure of the board, ownership structure of the board, CEO compensation,
and CEO ownership. Analyses result in a positive relationship between leadership
structure and EVA, but negative relationships of MVA with foreign ownership and
Table 1 Some studies based on the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance
CEO duality Sridharan and Marsinko (1997) Positive relationship between CEO
duality and firm performance
Chaganti et al. (1985) No relationship between CEO duality
and firm performance
Board size Kyereboah-Coleman et al.
(2006); Pearce and Zahra
(1992); Dehaene et al. (2001)
Positive relationship between board
size and firm performance
Mak and Kusnadi (2005);
Mollah (2007); Yermack
(1996)
Negative relationship between board
size and firm performance
Connelly and Limpaphayom
(2004)
No relationship between board size
and firm performance
Own. C.-10 Berle and Means (1932) Positive relationship between
ownership concentration and firm
profitability
Demsetz and Lehn (1985);
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)
No significant relationship between
ownership concentration and
profitability
Yurtoglu (2000) Negative relationship between
ownership concentration and firm
performance
Citak (2007) Positive relationship between
ownership concentration and
market-to-book value ratio
Man-own Jensen and Meckling (1976);
Hiraki et al. (2003)
Positive relationship between manager
ownership and performance
Himmelberg et al. (1999) No significant relationship between
manager ownership and performance
For.-own Aydın et al. (2007); Dwivedi
and Jain (2005)
Positive relationship between foreign
ownership and performance
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CEO compensation. However, the study finds no clear relationship between either
EVA or MVA with board structure and CEO ownership. In their study, in which
they use EVA and MVA as performance measures, Baliga et al. (1996) investigate
the relationship between CEO duality and performance on 500 corporations but
find no clear relationship between these variables. El Mir and Seboui (2008) attempt
to explain the relationship between EVA and created shareholder value by using
corporate governance principles. Their research findings suggest that corporate gov-
ernance principles are of importance in explaining the relationship between these
two variables. In their study on 219 Canadian firms, Adjaoud et al. (2007) use
accounting-based measures and value-based measures (like EVA and MVA)
together. The study finds no significant relationship between corporate governance
variables and accounting-based performance measures, while it finds a significant
positive relationship between corporate governance variables and EVA and MVA.
3. Research Design and Methodology
3.1. Sample
In this paper, the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance
is investigated on the basis of value-based performance measures, and the data set
covers the period 1998–2007. The data set is constructed using annual financial
statements and company yearbooks published by the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)
via their official website. Banks and financial sector institutions are excluded from
the analyses. Since ISE 100 is the major index representing ISE in a broad sense,
companies included in ISE-100 are the ones used in this study. In order to reach
more reliable parameter estimates, and hence to obtain more accurate results, panel
data set is used. For the sake of using a balanced panel and excluding financial
companies, 59 companies are eliminated leaving 41 companies for the analyses.
3.2. Variables Used in the Study
Since the use of EVA, MVA and CVA brings all interest groups and the corporation
together around the goal of creating shareholder value, theoretically these measures are
expected to move in parallel with corporate governance practices. In a study investigat-
ing the relationship between corporate governance implementation and firm perfor-
mance, we believe that value-based measures can reflect the performance of a
corporation better than accounting-based measures. Therefore, value-based measures
are used in this study. EVA, MVA and CVA are used as three different value-based per-
formance measures, while CEO duality, SOTB, ownership concentration, manager
ownership, and foreign ownership are the explanatory variables in the study. The deter-
mination of the variables is based on the literature (Sridharan and Marsinko, 1997;
Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Hiraki et al., 2003; Dwivedi and Jain, 2005; Kyereboah-
Coleman et al., 2006). All the variables used in the study are shown in Table 2.
As a performance measure suggested by Stern Stewart & Co., EVA is a measure
that is based on residual incomes of corporations (Grant, 2003). EVA considers
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financial performance on the basis of after-tax net operating income, investments
in assets required to generate this income and the cost of investments (Brewer
et al., 1999). Described in simpler terms, EVA is based on a corporation’s case of
generating an income at least as much as the cost of capital. Since EVA considers
both the cost of debt (which is a direct cost item) and the cost of equity (which is
an indirect cost item), analytically it differs widely from traditional accounting
measures (Grant, 2003). Another measure used in performance measurement
within the framework of the value-based management approach is MVA. Shawn
(1994) suggests that MVA is the best measure for assessing value creation – the
primary objective of a corporation. Many value-based management practitioners
Table 2 Explanatory variables and control variables used in the study
1In the calculation of WACC, annual interest rates applied by the Development Bank of Turkey to
medium-term investment loans were used as cost of borrowing. Capital Asset Pricing Model was used to
calculate the cost of equity. Using risk-free rate of return (Rf), expected return on the market (Rm),
market risk premium (Rm ) Rf) and the beta coefficient of the stock (b), the cost of equity (ke) was
calculated based on CAPM. The model used is as follows: Ke = Rf + (Rm ) Rf) · b. First of all, beta
coefficients of corporations required for cost of equity calculations were calculated using the Finnet Port-
folio Advisor program. Average simple interest rates on treasury bills of the corresponding periods were
used to represent risk-free rate of returns. These data were gathered via the website of the Central Bank
of Turkey. 2Gross cash investment was obtained by adding depreciable assets to non-depreciable assets.
Economic depreciation was calculated as follows (where n stands for the economic life): Economic depre-
ciation = [WACC ⁄ (1 + WACC)n ) 1] · depreciable assets. On the other hand capital load was
calculated as the multiplication of WACC by Gross Cash Investment.
Dependent
variables
EVA (Return on invested capital-weighted
average cost of capital) · Invested
capital1
EVA
MVA Total market value-total invested
capital
MVA





CEO-duality 1 when CEO is also the chairman of
the board of directors and 0
otherwise (dummy variable)
DUAL
Size of the board Logarithm of the number of members




The proportion of total ownership of
people or institutions with more
than 10% share to the total capital
of the firm (%)
OC-10
Manager ownership The percentage of shares owned by
CEO and board members (%)
MAN-O
Foreign ownership Amount of foreign capital ⁄ total equity FOR-O
Control variables Leverage ratio Total debt ⁄ total assets LR
Firm size Logarithm of total assets F-SIZE
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regard MVA as one of the most prominent measurement methods of value-based
management (John et al., 2000). Another dependent variable used in our study is
CVA. A new method that has recently emerged in the measurement of financial
performance, CVA is a value-based measure developed by American advisory insti-
tutions (Knight, 1998). The basic rationale behind developing CVA as a financial
performance measure is the opinion that cash flows are to be benefited at every
stage of corporate performance measurement. CVA does not take into account
returns, but emphasizes cash flow as the major factor in decision-making processes
(Heidari, 2003).
Variable DUAL in this study reflects the state of whether or not the CEO is also
the chairman of the board of directors. As a dummy variable, DUAL takes on the
value of either 1 or 0. SOTB stands for the number of members in the board of
directors and its logarithm is included in the model. The proportion of total owner-
ship of people or institutions with more than a 10% share of the total capital of the
firm is defined in percentage terms and represented by the variable OC-10. The
percentage of shares owned by the CEO and board members is represented by
the variable MAN-O. The expectation that foreign ownership will positively affect
the performance of firms in developed countries has led to including the variable
FOR-O as the ratio of foreign capital amount to equity in our model. We also use
leverage ratio (LR) and firm size as control variables in this study (Kim and Yoon,
2007; Moustafa, 2007).
3.3. Econometric Methodology and Model Structure
Regression estimates based on non-stationary data can be misleading. Therefore, the
series must be primarily tested for stationarity in all econometric studies (Granger
and Newbold, 1974). The stationarities of series are searched for by unit root tests.
In other words, whether or not the series has unit roots is investigated. Since panel
data models are used in this study and the data set has a time dimension, unit root
existence is investigated by panel unit root tests. Maddala and Wu (1999) suggest
that using panel unit root tests yields statistically better results compared to the
results of unit root tests like Philips-Perron, which are based on a single time series.
The most widely used recent tests for investigating the stationarity of panel data are
the Levin, Lin and Chu t-test (LLC t) developed by Levin et al. (2002) and the Im,
Peseran and Shin w-test (IPS w) developed by Im et al. (2003). The t-test developed
by Levin et al. (2002) to examine the common unit root processes and the w-test
developed by Im et al. (2003) are used in this study for checking the stationarity of
the series.
How much the changes in financial performance measures can be explained by
corporate governance variables is analyzed by multiple panel regression models,
which integrate the time and cross-section dimensions of the data set. Panel data
requires panel regression models for statistically more successful results. Therefore,
considering EVA, MVA and CVA variables as financial performance measures, three
different panel regression models are constructed.
A. Bayrakdaroglu et al.
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4. Empirical Results
Three panel regression models constructed to determine the effects of explanatory
variables on financial performance measures are analyzed. The decision to use either
the fixed effects model or the random effects model in regression analyses is made
utilizing statistical methods. Three panel regression models are analyzed and the
results are assessed.
In general, standardized data are used in the panel model structure, while raw
data are used for descriptive statistics to ensure that no information is lost. On the
other hand, since the panel model used includes both cross section and time series
dimensions, in analyzing the data structure, descriptive statistics are calculated and
assessed in panel data form. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.
The results of the LLC t-test and the IPS w-test that analyze panel stationarity
are presented in Table 4. Common unit root processes are examined by the LLC
t-test while individual unit root processes are examined by the IPS w-test, and as
seen in Table 4, the results of analyses indicate no unit root for any variable
(p < 0.01). In other words, the LLC t-test and the IPS w-test results indicate
stationarity of the series. Consequently, following unit root tests the series of the
variables used in modeling the relationship between corporate governance and
financial performance are proven to be stationary. Therefore, these variables are
appropriate for modeling and forecasting.
In this study both the fixed effects model and the random effects model are used
in constructing the panel regression models. The decision for using the fixed effects
and random effects models in this study is based on the Hausman test (Wooldridge,
2002; Greene, 2003). The equations in which EVA, MVA, and CVA are the depen-
dent variables are defined as model A, B, and C, respectively, in panel A, B, and C
of Table 5. Hausman test results of these three models are presented along with
panel regression results in Table 5.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum
EVA )1 540 235 5 897 635 )4 708 843 2 717 75
MVA 3 918 647 4 402 301 )5 946 908 6 523 516
CVA )5 926 902 3 832 697 )5 309 955 1 800 595
DUAL 0.0051502 0.221495 0.000000 1.000000
SOTB 7.274678 1.838783 4.000000 15.00000
OC-10 62.18077 1.597908 2.508000 96.41000
MAN-O 7.6743 16.5865 0.0000 76.9000
FOR-O 12.0248 18.4435 0.0000 67.0090
LR 0.475871 0.214856 0.057261 135.4350
F-SIZE 8.489858 0.648159 6.150009 9.938925
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Based on a test statistic of 18.96 and a corresponding p-value of 0.0020,
results of the Hausman test performed on the model for EVA suggest using the
fixed effects model in regression estimation. On the other hand, based on a test
statistic of 5.33 and a corresponding p-value of 0.3771, the Hausman test resulted
in favor of the random effects model for the relationship between MVA and cor-
porate governance variables. Similar to the model for EVA, Hausman test results
suggest using the fixed effects model for CVA (Hausman test statistic = 18.57 and
p-value = 0.0023). As seen in panel A of Table 5, the model for the relationship
between EVA and corporate governance variables is statistically significant at the
1% level of significance (F-statistic = 5.11 and p-value = 0.0002), while the model
for the relationship between MVA and corporate governance variables is statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level of significance (F-statistic = 1.94 and
p-value = 0.0887) as seen in panel B. Finally, panel C indicates that the model for
CVA is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance (F-statistic = 3.35
and p-value = 0.0062).
Evaluating all three models shown in the panels of Table 5, we conclude that
the variable DUAL, representing whether or not the CEO is also the chairman of
the board of directors, has statistically significant and positive relationships with
each EVA, MVA and CVA. In other words, CEO duality is found to affect corporate
performance positively. Variable DUAL is found to affect CVA of corporations the
most among three performance measures (coefficient = 30.641). On the other hand,
the variable DUAL affects EVA of corporations the least out of EVA, MVA and
CVA (coefficient = 1.234). These findings are consistent with those of Coles et al.
(2001), but contradict those of El Mir and Seboui (2008). The findings of Sridharan
and Marsinko (1997), and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) suggest positive relationships
of DUAL with different traditional performance measures such as Tobin’s Q, abnor-
mal returns, return on assets, return on equity, and after tax profit.
Table 4 LLC t and IPS w panel unit root test results
Variables
Levin, Lin and Chu t-test Im, Pesaran and Shin w-test
Test statistic p-value Test statistic p-value
EVA )29.0236 0.000 )9.47944 0.000
MVA )1082.98 0.000 )4.80396 0.000
CVA )37.7567 0.000 )10.1049 0.000
DUAL )2.86319 0.000 )2.04108 0.000
SOTB )23.5566 0.000 )4.45882 0.000
OC-10 )220465 0.000 )14206.7 0.000
MAN-O )2.8798 0.000 )7.0876 0.000
FOR-O )12.7765 0.000 )6.0986 0.000
LR )9.89569 0.000 )5.23368 0.000
F-SIZE )8.36552 0.000 )5.89220 0.000
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None of the models constructed reveals statistically significant relationships
between size of the board and performance measures (p-values; 0.915 [EVA], 0.277
[MVA], 0.742 [CVA]). This result means whether the board is large or not has no
significant effect on any of the value-based performance measures. Coles et al.
(2001) and Adjaoud et al. (2007) find no significant relationship of size of the
board with EVA and MVA either. From this perspective our findings seem to be
consistent with the literature. However, El Mir and Seboui (2008) find a significant
and negative relationship. Studies on the size of the board, using traditional perfor-
mance measures, yield contradictory results. There are studies that find positive
relationships of size of the board with traditional performance measures (Pearce
and Zahra, 1992; Dalton et al., 1998), while some studies find negative relationships
(Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Mollah, 2007). A study on
Turkish corporations finds no evidence that a large board of directors impacts nega-
tively upon corporate performance (Kaymak and Bektas, 2008).
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no significant relationship between ownership
concentration and firm profitability, while Berle and Means (1932) find a posi-
tive relationship between these variables. Yurtoglu (2000) concludes that owner-
ship concentration has a negative effect on corporate performance, while Citak
(2007) and Baek et al. (2004) suggest positive relationships of ownership concen-
tration with market-to-book value and Tobin’s Q. Contradictory conclusions are
reached on the relationship between ownership concentration and performance.
Similarly in our study it is not clear in what way concentrated ownership affects
corporate performance. Table 5 shows that the proportion of total ownership of
people or institutions with more than a 10% share of the total capital of the
firm (OC-10) is significantly related to both EVA and CVA. However, the rela-
tionship is negative for EVA (regression coefficient of OC-10 = )0.016) while it
is positive for CVA (regression coefficient of OC-10 = 0.298). In other words,
concentrated ownership can be said to increase corporate performance on the
basis of CVA and to decrease corporate performance on the basis of EVA. Panel
B of Table 5 reveals a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between
ownership concentration (OC-10) and MVA. It is clear that ownership concen-
tration has no significant effect (p-value = 0.692) on market performance repre-
sented by MVA.
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), if they are given a share of the com-
pany managers will better protect the rights of shareholders. Therefore, manager
ownership can be thought to affect corporate performance in a positive way. How-
ever, the results of analyses do not confirm this belief for the corporations under
the coverage of our study. As seen in panel A, the model for EVA shows a negative
relationship (coefficient = )0.027), while the models in panels B and C show posi-
tive relationships of manager ownership (MAN-O) with MVA and CVA respectively
(coefficients = 0.187 and 0.242). However, none of these three coefficients in the
models are significant. Similarly, Coles et al. (2001) draw attention to no insignifi-
cant effect of ownership concentration on changes in EVA and MVA. Similar
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findings exist in studies carried out using different performance measures (Himmel-
berg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).
Viewing the relationship between corporate governance and value-based finan-
cial performance from the perspective of foreign ownership, regression coefficients
except one turn out to be statistically significant in the models. The expectation that
foreign ownership in developed economies will affect corporate performance is valid
in the literature. This expectation is realized for a developing country like Turkey in
the model for EVA in our study. The model shows a positive and statistically signif-
icant relationship between foreign ownership (FOR-O) and EVA (coeffi-
cient = 0.0724; p-value = 0.072). As seen in panel B, foreign ownership and MVA
have a negative and significant relationship at the 5% level of significance. This
finding is consistent with previous studies. For example, Coles et al. (2001) find a
negative relationship. As seen in panel C there is no significant relationship between
foreign ownership and CVA (p-value = 0.671).
As a control variable used in this study LR displays a positive and significant
(at 5% level) relationship with EVA. Clearly, this means that as the weights of debt
in the capital structures of companies under analyses increase, so do the EVAs of
these companies. This finding is not consistent with that of Adjaoud et al. (2007). A
similar relationship between LR and CVA is found in our study. As the weight of
debt in the capital structure increases a higher amount of CVA will be experienced
by the company (coefficient = 28.51, p-value = 0.018). As can be seen in panels A
and C of Table 5, LR has the largest effect on CVA among the three performance
measures. The relationship of LR with MVA is consistent with the findings of Adja-
oud et al. (2007). LR and MVA have a negative and statistically significant relation-
ship. Therefore, MVA is negatively affected by increases in the level of debt in the
capital structure. On the other hand, authors like Black et al. (2003) and Kyereboah-
Coleman et al. (2006) argue the existence of a positive and significant relationship
between LR and performance measures. The finding in our study that leverage has
positive relationships with EVA and CVA seem to support their claim that compa-
nies utilizing a high level of debt might experience high performance. The other
control variable in our study is firm size. This variable has statistically significant
relationships with all three performance measures. Firm size has positive relation-
ships with EVA and CVA, while it has a negative relationship with MVA. According
to Adjaoud et al. (2007) positive relationship of firm size with EVA is consistent.
However, negative relationship of firm size with MVA in our study contradicts this
finding. Although Coles et al. (2001) find a negative relationship of firm size with
EVA and MVA, our findings for EVA contradict theirs, yet our findings for MVA
are consistent with theirs in terms of the direction of the relationship.
5. Summary and Conclusion
This study analyzes the relationship between firm performance and corporate gover-
nance. In investigating the relationship, financial performance measures EVA, MVA
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and CVA, developed within the context of value-based management, are used
as dependent variables. CEO-duality (DUAL), SOTB, ownership concentration
(OC-10), manager ownership (MAN-O), and foreign ownership (FOR-O) are the
explanatory variables in the study. In addition to these variables, two control vari-
ables, LR and firm size (F-SIZE), are used in to increase the significance of the
regression models. Models are based on 4 100 observations, covering the 1998–2007
period, of 41 corporations that are listed in ISE. These models are constructed using
panel data structure.
The findings of the study are partially consistent with theoretical expectations.
Regression results indicate that EVA, MVA and CVA increase if CEO is not the
member of the board of directors at the same time. Results suggest that the SOTB
does not have a significant effect on corporate performance. In general this result is
not consistent with theoretical expectations. Ownership concentration can be said
to have significant relationships with performance measures except for MVA. Con-
trary to theoretical expectations, manager ownership is not found to be an impor-
tant variable in increasing corporate performance within the context of value-based
management. However, foreign ownership is found to increase corporate perfor-
mance in terms of EVA and to decrease corporate performance in terms of MVA.
We hereby conclude our study with a suggestion for future potential studies: in
addition to value-based performance measures, measures like total shareholder
return, cash flow return on investment, shareholder value, and shareholder value
added can be taken into consideration as dependent variables.
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